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Freedom and Globalisation 
 









 Today liberalism (or neoliberalism) is blamed for the growing inequality and 
poverty in the world as well as for ideological fundamentalism. Since such discus-
sions are wide-ranging, held at universities and in political bodies, the author 
makes a distinction between liberalism as political philosophy and liberal – or as 
is now often called neoliberal – practical politics.  
 According to him, liberty and globalisation do not necessarily provide the best 
solutions without proper legal foundations, and it is difficult to legally lay them 
without a democratic procedure of decision-making. Since an international legal 
system and international democracy will likely not happen in the near future, the 
choices facing the developed and undeveloped countries are not easy at all. Al-
though liberalization is undoubtedly the only path to freedom, some of the neolib-
eral ideas have not proved appropriate and feasible. This is not the reason, how-
ever, to reject liberalism. On the contrary, this is the reason to continue efforts to 
bring down the walls dividing people and peoples.  
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 Liberalism has been criticized from the left as well as from the right. These criti-
cisms very often concur: It is not only freedom that is important, but also justice; it is 
not only the individual that is important, but the society as well; the world market is not 
the sole criterion; national needs ought to be taken into account as well. Karl Polanyi 
who, some sixty years ago, offered probably the most damning and extensive criticism 
of the liberal champions of the globalisation of free trade – people who today would be 
branded as partisans of the ideology of neoliberalism – wrote that both communism and 
nazism, or totalitarianism in general, were an answer to the uncontrolled liberalization 
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and to the “taking the society and not only the commodities to the market” (Polanyi, 
1944; Gligorov, 1996). Today liberalism (or neoliberalism) is blamed for the growing 
inequality and poverty in the world as well as for ideological fundamentalism. 
 Since such discussions are wide-ranging, held at universities and in political bodies, 
I suggest we first make a distinction between liberalism as political philosophy and lib-
eral – or as is now often called neoliberal – practical politics. They will be analysed in 
turn.  
 
 Freedom and choice 
 Liberal political philosophy is committed solely to the idea of freedom.1 This by all 
means implies individual freedom, but not necessarily only individual freedom. 
Namely, it is difficult to have free societies if its members are not free – that is the so-
called liberal individualism.2 However, some may think that there is no other freedom 
but individual freedom, while some may say that there are other aspects of freedom (for 
example national freedoms – as liberal nationalists have claimed – or social freedoms – 
as some social liberals argue). If freedom is understood as a right – which is debatable – 
then it is only natural that liberalism upholds the idea of individual rights; however, not 
every liberalism reduces all rights to individual ones (e.g. collective rights of minorities, 
the right to self-determination of peoples and nations, and an array of other collective 
rights). Individual rights, on the other hand, have to protect at least negative liberty 
(freedom from coercion, freedom of thought, movement, work, ownership of property), 
but some liberals think it is essential to ensure positive liberty as well (the right to cer-
tain, let us say fundamental possessions). In general, liberal political philosophy accepts 
pluralism, and – as Rawls would say – the idea that reasonable people need not always 
agree about the meaning and significance of ultimate values. On the contrary, in line 
with Isaiah Berlin, Rawls thought that pluralism of values is inevitable.  
 One should not draw the conclusion that liberalism is too liberal. From the analytical 
point of view, liberal political philosophy is quite exact, by far more exact than any 
other. Besides being individualistic, it indicates that there is no communism of political 
ideals. In fact, the analytical contribution of liberalism consists in the fact that it claims 
it can prove there is a conflict or at least competition among the individual and the so-
cial, the private and the public, as well as between freedom and equality, freedom and 
justice. There is also a conflict between democracy and market, which partly relates to 
the disparity between the national and the international. 
 To summarize: unlike the collectivist and some other theories, the liberal political 
philosophy claims that there must be a choice when political ideals and institutions are 
concerned. This was undoubtedly obvious to Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hume, Burke, Con-
 
1 Lord Acton superbly wrote about that. See, for example, The History of Freedom in Antiquity and The 
History of Freedom in Christianity (both can be accessed on the Internet). There is no general consent among 
liberals as to what it precisely means. Relevant for this is the debate between Hart and Rawls. For Rawls’ 
latest response, see Rawls (2000). 
2 This is not the same as methodological individualism, which will be dealt with later. 
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stant, Kant, and Mill, to mention just a few among the most influential authors of the 
past (as was, of course, to many other major political philosophers, from Plato and Ar-
istotle onwards, who cannot be considered liberals). In contemporary political philoso-
phy there is a precise analytical framework that enables thorough analyses of the issues 
of the compatibility of political ideals, institutions, ends and means. This framework 
was largely designed by Arrow, Harsanyi, Sen, Kolm, Rawls, and Nozick (not all of 
them liberals).3 
 Analyses are necessary since liberal political philosophy does not stop at the promo-
tion of individual and other liberties but asserts that there are liberal answers to the fun-
damental questions explored by political philosophy, such as what is justice, what is 
implied by inequality, the features of different ways of decision-making, which political 
regimes are stable, how to avoid international conflicts, what can be known about poli-
tics at all, i.e. which is the cognitive range of political philosophy. 
 In order to illustrate my point, let me give you an example. Liberals do not stop at 
saying that it is best for prices to be set on the market but, just like all other economists, 
they analyse the processes of price formation as well as the features of market prices. 
The same applies for example to the influence of the relationship between freedom and 
free action on the welfare of an individual, on the fairness of distribution and the pro-
gress of economy and society. In other words, it is one thing to say “let’s leave it to the 
market” and quite another to say that we are not interested in the assumptions and the 
consequences of that recommendation. The first is characteristic for liberals, while the 
other – the idea of intellectual responsibility – is not typical for the liberal thought. 
 
 Globalisation and democracy 
 As an example of the necessity of choice let us take a look at the ongoing debate on 
globalisation and democracy. There is no doubt that globalisation – implying the liber-
alization of global economy i.e. the expansion of market relations across national bor-
ders – clashes with liberalism due to the national and not the international character of 
the state. This opposition may, in principle, be resolved in two ways: by restricting in-
ternational trade and international markets and business ties in general or by the inter-
nationalization of political institutions.4  
 In order to clarify what I mean, I would like to draw attention to the untenable opin-
ion of some critics of globalisation, for example some Balkan authors. There are those 
among them who are in favour of the accession of their countries to the EU member-
ship. However, for Croatia or Serbia, for example, joining the European Union would 
represent almost a complete globalisation of these two small countries and economies: 
the EU is even now for them almost the entire world, and will be even more so when 
 
3 I wrote about this in detail in Gligorov (1985). 
4 Rodrik excellently wrote about this (2002b). 
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they join the EU.5 Such Europeanism of critics of globalisation might be understood if 
democracy were important to them for example as a regulator of the market competition 
and a corrector of social inequality, and if the European Union were democratically or-
ganized. However, that is not the case yet. Admittance to the EU presupposes the inter-
nationalization of all national markets; at least for the time being, very limited democ-
ratic control is possible over their operation (there is a somewhat bigger possibility of 
bureaucratic control). Thus, an opponent of globalisation in, let us say, Croatia or Ser-
bia, should also be an opponent of the integration of those countries into the EU. By the 
same token, the advocates of free trade should be opposed to the idea of nation-states 
and in favour of the integration into the European Union. Anyway, it is surprising that 
some leftist critics of globalisation are at the same time champions of human rights all 
over the world, although it is clear that protectionism must violate at least some human 
rights. On the other hand, the rightist advocates of globalisation often demonstrate a 
weakness for the nation-state, which in this context can only represent a means of inter-
fering into the workings of the market.6 
 In simple words, socialism and globalisation do not go hand in hand, and neither do 
nationalism and globalisation. These are the dilemmas that the EU is faced with, and the 
continuation of its entire project depends on how these dilemmas are to be resolved.  
 
 Market and equality 
 Even older than this dilemma is the wrangling about liberty and equality. Liberal po-
litical philosophy claims that bigger freedom does not necessarily imply bigger equality 
and vice versa. Let us take the market as an example. What is its relation to liberty? In 
that that the market exchange is voluntary and in that sense, free. It should be pointed 
out here that political philosophy, just like theoretical economy (particularly neoclassi-
cal), understands the market as a conventionalized, theoretical construction, and not a 
particular real institution. However, the assumption of a voluntary exchange applies to 
all empirical market institutions: if there is no voluntary exchange, there is no market.  
 This does not mean that all participants in an exchange are equal, and even all those 
who want to take part in it cannot do that since, of course, they have to have something 
of value to other people to exchange. They are equally free, but in such a theoretical 
context this is almost a tautology. In everything else they can be completely different (to 
an extent they have to be in order for an exchange to take place at all). Theoretically, the 
market is neutral in relation to the distribution of commodities or everything that is sig-
nificant for this or that understanding of equality. The real market institutions, however, 
do not have to be. 
 Here it is necessary to define the meaning of this neutrality. First, the market is a 
theoretical abstraction, since every real market is an institution in its own right. Second, 
 
5 I wrote in more detail about this and about the theoretical assumptions of the integration in Delayed 
Integration, WIIW Research Report 2000. 
6 On problems of internationalization of human rights, see Rawls (1998). 
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the fictitious market is neutral in relation to distribution because – in a way – it assumes 
it.7 Third, the fictitious and the real market can also function if there is absolute equality 
according to some criterion. For example, even if everybody has an income, they could 
exchange that income for different sorts of labour or services; or they might buy and sell 
commodities they have. Of course, it has been shown more than once that free trade 
goes hand in hand with enormous disparities, for example the existence of involuntary 
unemployment (as Keynes showed), or with the situation of utmost inequality, or even 
the situation in which people starve to death en masse, as has been marvellously shown 
by Peter Hammond.8  
 What applies to the fictitious market does not have to apply to a real market. It may 
be privately or publicly owned, can have a bigger or smaller number of participants, 
may be regulated in a variety of ways and may significantly affect the outcome of free 
exchange. Theoretically, it is assumed that everybody has something to exchange and 
that nobody has any influence over the prices (plus some other things which are of no 
significance for the time being). However, in the circumstances of dire poverty, the 
freedom to trade does not mean much to a person who has nothing to sell and no means 
to buy something. Also, when the prices can be fixed in many ways, the distribution is 
predetermined. In such a context, it is difficult to draw a fine line between voluntariness 
and coercion, as Nozick recognized.9 In a way, Hegel also showed that there are ele-
ments of voluntariness, i.e. free choice, even in a person’s consent to slavery.  
 This does not mean that theoretically the concept of market is useless (more about 
this later) or that nothing can be said about how real markets affect the distribution of 
commodities. On the contrary, much is known about the social role of the market. As 
the market exchange is voluntary, the market greatly affects social stability. Also, mar-
kets’ openness offers a bigger chance to people to demonstrate their abilities than is the 
case with some other social institutions. Besides, since the market rewards hard work 
and ability, it undoubtedly strengthens social loyalty to at least some aspects of social 
justice. And finally, trade plays an important role in the spreading of knowledge, both 
technical and cultural. This last aspect has been noticed by many sociologists who have 
analysed the social role of competition, particularly the “cooperative” one, typical for 
 
7 Whether this assumption can be consistently endorsed is not an issue in economic theory. The criticisms 
that can be found in Sraffa (1961) used to be very influential. 
8 See Hammond (1995). This is technically complicated, but it is easy to follow the main idea: Let us 
suppose that the market is Pareto-optimal (the optimal distribution of goods is the one in which a 
redistribution cannot make anyone better off without at the same time making somebody worse off). Let us 
assume that one person has everything and the others nothing. That is the Pareto-optimal condition, even if all 
the people but that one starve to death, since the position of those poor wretches can be improved only at the 
expense of the deteriorated position of that fabulously rich person. Keynes’ involuntary unemployment, on the 
other hand, can be understood in several ways, among which the most usual is the one in which the labour 
market is not flexible enough; consequently, the situation in which the labour supply is bigger than the 
demand – at the existing level of the wages – is not enough to reduce the price of labour i.e. the wages, so 
people want to work but there is no work for them, at least not at the prevalent market price. Keynes’ 
involuntary unemployment can also exist when all the prices are flexible, but this is not so important for our 
purpose. 
9 See Nozick (1997). 
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market institutions. The influence of trade on the quality of human capital has been 
noted by many, especially by Arrow and Lucas in the context of analyzing the signifi-
cance of learning by experience. 
 Of course, everything comes at a price. Thus the evolution of market institutions, 
where previously nonexistent, happens at the expense of the existing institutions. What 
all this may mean is well-known from the general research on modernization and devel-
opment. This should not be confused with the problems facing the transitional countries 
where non-market institutions are being abandoned; these institutions’ primary purpose 
was to thwart the attempts at market-formation or, where the market was well-devel-
oped, to eliminate it or at least restrict it. Also, the countries with the controlled market, 
in which the state tampers with price-fixing – and many so-called developing countries 
belong to this category – do not have to cope with the same problems as the ones that 
rely on traditional institutions which, at least partly, are not market institutions. Under 
all those circumstances, the expansion of the market leads to significant changes, but 
they are different in the process of modernization from those in the processes of liber-
alization and transition.10 
 In the modernization of traditional societies, one type of social equilibrium is re-
placed with another. In that process traditional institutions can collapse and anomie may 
ensue (in Durkheim’s words), the state of affairs characterized by the institutional 
void.11 The situation is different when repressive regimes are being liberalized or 
totalitarian ones transformed. Through those processes, when successful, economic and 
political life is normalized, and the position of most people gets improved, at least in 
that respect. One may talk about creative destruction, to use Schumpeter’s term. 
 Theoretically speaking, there are two types of changes. Development requires the 
transition from one Pareto-optimum to another, where redistributions can be extremely 
high, since the number of losers at the beginning may be pretty high, and in some things 
even higher than the number of winners. Transitions, if carried out properly, almost 
mean the transition from one Pareto-inferior to another Pareto-superior state, since the 
number of true losers is significantly smaller than the number of true winners. This does 
not mean that everyone will profit equally, so social differences may even increase.  
 In both these cases, we are dealing with dynamic processes that may unfold in a 
variety of ways with very different – even opposite – outcomes. This is clear when we 
have a look at what is known about the processes in Africa where the transformation of 
the traditional society has been going on, or in Latin America where economy – under 
considerable political pressures – is being liberalized, and in the transitional countries in 
which socialism is on the wane.  
 
 
10 Karl Polanyi discussed this nicely in the above mentioned book when he analysed the impact of 
industrialization on agrarian societies.  
11 In this context there is much talk about the so-called weak states or failed states. I wrote on this in 
Gligorov (2002). 
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 Liberty and rights 
 Perhaps now something might be said about the relationship between freedom and 
rights. To say that a person is free to participate in exchange or to do anything, does not 
mean that they are entitled to it. For example, the freedom of gainful employment does 
not imply the right to work. Just as the freedom of purchase does not imply the right to 
any commodity. However, one should not draw the conclusion that liberals do not want 
people (and perhaps someone else) to have rights. On the contrary, liberals usually stand 
for the equality of rights, i.e. that everyone enjoys the same rights. When they say “eve-
ryone”, a number of liberals literally think everyone, the universal equality of human 
rights, i.e. the globalisation of human rights. This also implies the globalisation of free-
doms and the globalisation of their protection. This, in turn, implies an international le-
gal system and a network of international organizations that are able to implement it.  
 Of particular importance is an aspect of the relationship between liberty and rights: 
the right to work. As has already been said, Keynes pointed to the fact that all those who 
want to work are not necessarily able to find a job, the state of affairs he called invol-
untary unemployment. He did not think that there was a right to work but he did think 
that the state is politically obliged to provide for full employment. Not because other-
wise democracy could not be preserved (and particularly not because a party might lose 
the elections), but because liberals champion liberty and because it is supposed to en-
able everyone to realize their abilities. If there is involuntary unemployment, then the 
very idea of liberty may be at risk. 
 Keynes also analysed the systems with involuntary employment, but not within the 
framework of free market.12 This because, for example, moonshining is not something 
easily understood in the market economy. But, where it exists – and there is a lot of it in 
the transitional countries, particularly in the Balkans – there is the question of volun-
tariness, since those who moonshine do not enjoy the same rights as their unemployed 
counterparts i.e. those in a contractual relation with their employers. This difference is 
enormously important because it shows that the fact that a freedom does not necessarily 
imply a right does not mean that authorities are not obliged to provide protection, pri-
marily from illegitimate coercion.  
 This applies to all market relations. The fact that a market exchange is voluntary 
does not mean that a person may buy something without paying for it. Neither does it 
mean that liberals ignore the importance of the legal protection of market relations that 
are by and large contractual. Thus it cannot be said that non-contractual relations i.e. 
those that do not envisage for the legal possibility for contract protection are involun-
tary. That is why liberals champion the rule of law.13 
 
12 Although the idea of involuntary employment is implied in the idea of involuntary unemployment. 
Because if an involuntarily unemployed person gains income by performing some work or service then either 
there is no involuntary unemployment here or the person is involuntarily employed.  
13 Hayek often wrote on the topic of the importance of the rule of law and due to this he may be classified 
as a neo-Kantian, although this is not an interpretation that I would like to dwell much upon since that subject 
– the relationship Kant-Hayek – is rather obscure. As to what should the nature of legal system be, that is 
another issue; it should be noted that Hayek was no advocate of legal constructivism. 
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 Two conclusions about the relationship between liberty and rights can be drawn 
from this. The first is that to be free does not mean to have a specific right. The second 
is that liberty must be protected, which is implied by the concept of negative liberty 
(built into the very fundaments of the rule of law). 
 
 Social justice 
 The question of social justice should be mentioned in this context. Before highlight-
ing the two aspects of social justice that I find particularly important, it is necessary to 
mention the findings of major studies by Alesina, Rodrick and others that show the 
positive impact that a higher degree of social justice may have on economic 
growth.14This is because conflicts cost, and they can be more numerous if social 
inequality is more pronounced and particularly if not in accordance with what is consid-
ered as just in a society. Thus the degree of inequality that a particular society considers 
just can provide a more lasting social stability which, in turn, if maintained, may ensure 
a higher degree of liberty and security of people.  
 Another aspect of social justice is its ambiguous relation to injustice. It is interesting 
that many who are against the idea of collective accountability nevertheless believe in 
social (collective) justice.15 A conclusion may be drawn from this: they think that – after 
all – there is something called collective responsibility (for example, for the exploitation 
of workers and employees in general) or they think that social justice is not used to cor-
rect an injustice. In my opinion, the second interpretation is the one championed by 
some liberals. This is social solidarity at work, a certain moral obligation, so to say. If 
this is true, it is only appropriate to ask why such an obligation would not be honoured 
voluntarily? It could be said that morality, unfortunately, is not powerful enough to al-
low for that, what is undoubtedly true when one sees how little is done to assist the poor 
in undeveloped countries.  
 Ensuing from this is the second aspect of social justice: this is not a collective justice 
that would have to correct a collective injustice, but a requirement that the society im-
poses on those individuals who have not harmed anyone. This demand may plausibly be 
imposed only by means of a democratic procedure that gives legitimacy to the decision 
of the majority to control the degree of social inequality. This indeed means tampering 
with individual liberty. This also means that social justice restricts liberty, albeit in a 
democratic way. However, that does not run counter to liberal political philosophy (al-
though it may run – and rightly so – counter to a concrete liberal economic policy). Be-
 
14 See for example Alesina/Rodrik (1994). In this article it is claimed that the level of equality is tied to 
the economic growth in democratic states. This raises the question of the relationship between economic 
growth and democracy. For the time being there is no consensus on what kind of conclusions the research data 
point to. One of the arguments in favour of the positive relationship between democracy and economic growth 
is that authoritarian regimes prove to be unstable in the long run and that the crises that inevitably break out in 
them are much more expensive than the tendency of democracies to curtail certain economic freedoms. 
15 This is primarily the case among communists and socialists, though it is not alien to social liberals and 
liberal democrats as well. 
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cause, as has already been said, the tension between the individual and the social, the 
private and the public, lies in the very foundations of liberal thought. Liberals are on the 
side of freedom, but the majority in a society need not be liberal, in which case the price 
that democracy (national or international) exacts in order to preserve liberty may be ac-
ceptable and even the smallest possible. 
 This does not mean that liberals think the issues of justice and fairness are purely 
political. On the contrary, liberal political philosophy has greatly contributed to the fact 
that the problem of fair distribution can be precisely analysed. For example, Nozick 
claimed that any distribution based on free exchange (or, equally, any distribution that 
does not violate any laws forbidding theft, injury, and alike) is just. However, this does 
not solve all the issues in the domain of courts, for example, so that an entire new area 
of law and economy has been developed in order to define more precisely what a just 
distribution is, e.g. when this definition is a bone of contention.16 
 Nozick’s interpretation should not be confused with the opinion that the analysis of 
the concept of justice ought to be relinquished altogether; likewise, it is not true that the 
fact that exchanges are free means that an inquiry into the underlying causes and its 
consequences should be given up altogether. If this were so, then economic and other 
political sciences would become obsolete. Regardless of whether it is thought that the 
idea of social justice is meaningful or not, there is no doubt that any system of taxation 
is based on an understanding of a fair distribution of the burden of public spending. 
Even where there is only one tax rate – which is very rare – it is clear that those who 
have more also pay more for more or less same public services, at least in democratic 
societies. 
 Two liberal theories, Nozick’s and Rawls’, could be related here. It is one thing to 
say that people ought to pay taxes voluntarily, and entirely another to define which dis-
tribution is fair when taxes are enforced. James Buchanan wrote extensively on this 
topic.17 Where there is political coercion, there is the problem of social justice. Which is 
its precise content, is another question. 
 
 Theory of justice 
 John Rawls has made justice once again the central concept of political philosophy. 
The idea of justice that he analyses is by all means social. He must be given credit for 
pointing to the fact that every justice is in a way social, although his understanding of 
justice has met with serious criticism. Nevertheless, two aspects of justice highlighted 
by him cannot be bypassed in any version of liberal thought.  
 Social justice is an essential part of the system or the constitution of liberty because 
it should enable everyone to live the way they want, i.e. to realize the abilities they have 
been endowed with in the way and the combination that suits them best. This does not 
mean that society is obliged to put into practice a set of positive freedoms, which has 
 
16 See Posner (1981; 1999). For a fine review of this topic, see Kaplow/Shavell (2002). 
17 See Buchanan/Tullock (1961); Buchanan (1975). 
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been pointed out by Hart in his critique – but it nevertheless is a test of liberty in a soci-
ety. That is why liberals are not indifferent to poverty, misery or unemployment, not be-
cause they think that this represents a fair renumeration to people for what they might 
contribute but, for some reason, have been thwarted from contributing. They only think 
that the causes of these social inequalities may largely be eliminated together with tyr-
anny, dictatorship, discretionary rule, totalitarianism, bullying, and all other forms of 
the systems of dependency and injustice. Hence the advocacy of the free market, the 
rule of law and democracy. 
 Besides, the question of justice comes up because, theoretically, the free exchange 
does not solve the problems of distribution which, in turn, pop up because every ex-
change may have several outcomes. Even when prices cannot be fixed, there might be 
problems with the distribution of goods both within one generation and especially be-
tween different generations. These problems exist regardless of the manner in which a 
system of justice is organized. Even if judges and other mediators were hired to resolve 
conflicts, as is the case in the countries where the settlements of disputes are breached 
via lawyers, the issue of justice and fairness remains more or less the same. 
 This is the reason why the study of justice and fairness has made headway precisely 
in the area of liberal political philosophy. It should be noted here that even when justice 
and equality are discussed from the socialist and other non-liberal perspectives, the 
analytical language used is the one developed by liberalism. The other approaches run 
into problems at the outset when trying to formulate the problem regardless of how in-
teresting their solutions might be. 
 
 Neoliberalism 
 It might be wise now to turn from the inquiry of liberal political philosophy to lib-
eral politics, or what is now known as neoliberalism. The difference between them is 
like the difference between the idea of liberty and the process of emancipation or liber-
alization. For example, free market is one thing while the liberalization of markets is 
something else. The same goes for privatization, globalisation, democratization. For ex-
ample, economy based on private ownership is more efficient than any other we know 
of, but privatization does not necessarily lead to an instantaneous increase in efficiency. 
The same applies to liberalization. Champions of neoliberalism have at times chosen to 
ignore this, the fact that Stiglitz rather brutally reminded them of. 
 What is neoliberalism? Regarding its stance on globalisation, the situation is rela-
tively clear. Namely, Williamson codified what he called the Washington consensus on 
the economic policy for developing countries – what is usually meant when neoliberal-
ism is mentioned in that context.18 This is an opinion that – to put it simply – macroeco-
nomic stability, liberalization of free trade and privatization result in high rates of eco-
 
18 For the original formulation, see Williamson (1990). 
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nomic growth and an accelerated economic development. There are very well-known 
critiques of that consensus, most notably the one by the already mentioned Rodrick.19 
 This neoliberalism is related to what used to be called supply-side economics. It was 
(rightly so, in my opinion) based on an assumption that the long-term growth rate of an 
economy – whether developed or undeveloped – is mostly determined by the institu-
tional and systemic factors, primarily (in the case of successful economies) private 
ownership, free market and the politics of principles. For economists, just like every-
thing else, this is a contentious issue, but much more momentous are the disputes about 
how important these factors are for the short-term economic policy in which Keynes’ 
teaching still prevails. It must be borne in mind that Keynes was a liberal and by no 
means hostile to the free market. However, his views, at least those that can be found in 
The General Theory are not especially useful in understanding globalisation since they 
exclusively refer to the problems confronting contemporary national states in the cir-
cumstances of a restricted operation of the world market, i.e. non-globalised markets.20  
 
 Liberalization and social inequalities 
 Neoliberalism promotes liberalization of trade, both national and international. Ana-
lytically speaking, it is true that any level of inequality is possible in free trade. This 
only means that the market may operate even in the conditions of inequality, undevel-
opment and poverty. However, this does not mean that the liberalization of real markets 
cannot mean a bigger degree of equality than some other way of distributing goods. In-
deed, research has shown that this is true, for example during the episodes of mass 
famine. Sen studied them and concluded that in the biggest number of cases mass star-
vation is caused not by the scarcity of goods but by the collapse of the system of distri-
bution of goods, especially the non-market ones.21 Truth to tell, this insight was ad-
vanced by the Russian economists of the early 1920s in their analyses of the mass fam-
ine caused by the abolition of free trade.  
 What goes for mass starvation should apply at least to some extent to poverty and 
deprivation which are indeed more uncommon in economies with free markets. As of 
lately, there has been a noticeable decrease of poverty and deprivation globally, primar-
ily due to the remarkable improvements in India and China that have been, perhaps only 
in part – I would say a significant part – caused by the liberalization of economic activity. 
 Concerning the impact of the liberalization of the world trade on the increase of 
equality or inequality in the world, there is an undergoing debate about what the data 
 
19 For a simple review of his critique, see Rodrik (2002a). 
20 Of course, Keynes’ contribution to the understanding of globalisation was huge thanks to his work 
preceding The General Theory; he also contributed to the creation of the postwar global economic system 
which was later largely abandoned following the collapse of the system of fixed exchange rates in the first 
half of the 1970s. 
21 With his characteristic lucidity and clarity, Sen summarized his ideas on globalisation and inequality in 
“Ten Theses on Globalization” (2001). 
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point to.22 However, it is possible that the negative consequences for equality – if there 
are any – are the result of the obstacles placed by nation-states to the operation of the 
market, both internal and external. It seems that the data indicate, for example, that the 
creation of a common and later single market in Europe has resulted not only in an in-
crease in production but also in an increase in equality.23 But it is also possible, as some 
other studies show, that selective liberalization leads to an increase in social inequality. 
From the theoretical point of view, it might turn out that a partial liberalization in the 
process of transition may worsen the conditions in individual industries and regions and, 
consequently, for certain groups of people. Practically, certain gradualness cannot be 
avoided and that is why a much more important question is the sequence of liberaliza-
tion, e.g. whether the liberalization of trade should precede the liberalization of financial 
transactions or vice versa. 
 Here the experience of the former Yugoslavia and the states created by its 
disintegration might be useful. Although the advocates of liberalization in the former 
Yugoslavia were criticized by the New Left and the nationalists, who used approxi-
mately the same arguments they are using today, it is clear that the little neoliberalism 
there was greatly contributed both to the industrial efficiency and the equality. Also, it 
suffices to compare Slovenia, which upon its recognition immediately liberalized its 
foreign trade, with Croatia (Serbia is an even worse example), that did not. This com-
parison is good not only as an argument in favour of neoliberalism but may be used for 
its criticism. Namely, Slovenia had radically and swiftly liberalized its foreign trade, be-
fore it liberalized its banking system (now there is a serious lag). Croatia did the oppo-
site. Thus Slovenia, although its output is somewhat smaller than Croatia’s, exports 
about twice as much (and five times more than Serbia), while almost all Croatian banks 
are owned by foreigners. A similar pattern is noticeable in most Balkan transitional 
countries, although the experiences of the more developed transitional countries are 
somewhat more auspicious regarding financial liberalization. It might be concluded that 
an early liberalization of foreign trade is more important than the liberalization of some 
financial markets, the opinion that is today, after the Asian crisis of 1997, almost an or-
thodoxy in international financial institutions though the debate among economists is 
still (as could be expected) raging (Edison/Klein/Ricci/Sloek, 2002).  
 
 World markets and economic policy issues 
 The need to decide what to liberalize first arises from the fact that national and 
international markets do not operate under the same circumstances and thus have differ-
ent consequences. World markets are faced with greater risks because legal protection is 
much less adequate, while sovereign states may be adversaries and bring all kinds of 
decisions. And finally, fewer information are available to the participants in the ex-
change on the world market. A higher level of risk and fewer information especially af-
 
22 Major works may be found at the World Bank’s web site. 
23 At least that is the conclusion one reaches from the works by Dan Ben-David from the University of 
Tel Aviv. Rodrik challenges these findings as well. 
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fect the conduct of financial markets, the fact that after the Asian, Russian and now 
Latin American crises became obvious enough even to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), as their representatives have acknowledged since.  
 In this context, perhaps it is appropriate to say something about Stiglitz’s criticisms 
directed at the above mentioned IMF.24 Three Stiglitz’s objections are perhaps most piv-
otal and have been adopted by the IMF in one way or another. One refers to its mone-
tary policy. Is it wise to protect the exchange rate with the interest rate? Increasingly, 
the answer is negative. In my opinion, this is where a mistake was made in Russia.25 
According to Stiglitz – and now also to Stanley Fisher – if I understood him correctly, 
not only in Russia but in many other places as well. The second objection refers to fiscal 
policy i.e. the attitude to budget deficits. This objection is linked to the first. Because, if 
you protect the exchange rate, it is not good that the budgetary spending increases faster 
than the revenues, for the simple reason that a state’s heavy borrowing increases the risk 
that it will be impossible to maintain the exchange rate. Let us suppose that, for some 
reason, there is a recession in a country. Under normal circumstances, this would trigger 
off a drop in the interest rates; however, if the exchange rate is fixed, the pressures on it 
might increase since investments are going down, causing a rise of the interest rates 
necessary to maintain the required level of investments, which will in turn increase 
budgetary obligations even if nothing else changes, and the country will have to borrow 
some more, which means additional pressures on the exchange rate. Under such circum-
stances, the IMF often demanded that interest rates be increased and public spending re-
duced. This is unfeasible in a recession. Nevertheless, for a time, the prevailing as-
sumption was that it was necessary to speed up structural reforms by for example clos-
ing banks, companies and by bringing down unemployment; in a recession, this might 
be like putting out fire with gasoline. If I understood correctly, Stanley Fisher agrees 
with all this now (Fisher, 2001). And finally, the third objection refers to the conditions 
set by the IMF. This is a broad topic, but there is a growing consensus that the devel-
oping countries need to be given a bigger leeway when looking for a strategy that suits 
them best.26  
 
 Inequality and democracy 
 The market affects the level of social inequality much less than some other institu-
tions. For example, democracy. It is true that the market may function even in undemo-
cratic political circumstances, but there is no democracy without the free market. De-
mocracy is a political mechanism of a redistribution of resources (not solely that) that 
can be guided by the ideal of greater social equality. Because, if the majority want 
 
24 A brilliant summary of Stiglitz’s criticism can be found in his debate with Kenneth Rogoff in the World 
Bank at the end of June of this year. 
25 I wrote about this together with Niklas Sundstrom (1998). 
26 For a well-balanced article about a similar problem that the World Bank is faced with, see Einhorn 
(2001). Detailed criticisms of the IMF and the World Bank can be found in the famous report to the American 
Congress by Alan Meltzer and Jeffrey Saks. Alan Meltzer also criticized the World Bank’s loan policy. 
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equality, then the rule of the majority is a means to achieve that goal. Of course, the 
majority need not be loyal to the ideal of equality, regardless of the fact that many take 
it for granted. It is possible that a bigger wealth will bring about an increase in the value 
of differences and inequalities. What seems the norm in impoverished countries need 
not be a goal in more affluent societies. In that sense it is possible that the value of free-
dom is going to increase and that democracy ceases to primarily be a means of the re-
distribution of goods. For the time being, however, it seems that at work is – though far 
from perfect – the so-called Wagner’s law that more developed states – all of them de-
mocratic – have bigger states. Also, Rodrik showed that wages in democracies are 
higher than in non-democratic regimes, ceteris paribus, it can also mean that develop-
ment and higher solidarity, e.g. by the legally guaranteed wage floor, go hand in hand.  
 The recommendations by neoliberals to liberalize trade and to democratize govern-
ment if economic progress and greater equality are to be achieved are not empirically 
groundless, regardless of the fact that there is always plenty of room for philosophical 
and scientific debates. Of course, liberalization and democratization within a state and 
among states are two different things, so there is reason enough to analyse globalisation 
separately, since liberalization is faced with entirely different problems in that area. 
Global democracy is still a very remote possibility, and there is a number of those who 
think that it is not only implausible but undesirable as well. 
 
 Liberalism, nationalism and globalisation 
 Liberalism and nationalism had not been on the best of terms even before globalisa-
tion got in the way. Truth to tell, it was relatively a long time ago. When talking about 
theories, liberal cosmopolitanism in a way preceded liberal nationalism. Unfortunately, 
the system that emerged at the time of the so-called first globalisation (between 1814 
and World War I) was based on the nation-states and not on the global legal and politi-
cal institutions. Today, the process of globalisation is once again stopped at national 
borders and runs into obstacles they put up to the spreading of international law. What 
does that conflict mean for liberals? 
 Among the early liberal theories, especially significant is Kant’s teaching on cos-
mopolitanism. He was aware that peace can be established only if a political framework 
for the universalization of moral principles he promoted is set up. Truth to tell, you do 
not have to be Kant to see that something is wrong with the system of nation-states and 
the world order based on the balance of power, because that system implies that wars 
are going to be waged for the sake of accomplishing national goals and that there will be 
threats of using force to maintain that balance of power. This is obviously unacceptable, 
both from the moral and the political point of view. Also, you do not have to be Kant to 
see that the solution lies in the rule of law. What excludes wars from the national poli-
tics can exclude them from the international politics. The problem is only in the political 
form of such cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2002).  
 Kant thought that there can be no single unitary state because he believed, just like 
many other political philosophers, that great countries are inevitably despotic. That is 
why he thought that a solution might be found in a confederation of free states. Such a 
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confederation would provide not only for the states but for the individuals as well. It is 
obvious, therefore, that the solution should be sought in liberal international cosmopol-
itanism, something that perhaps the European Union is transforming into.  
 Of course, this presupposes the rejection of nationalism. The problems that national-
ism is going to confront have been thoroughly analysed by Lord Acton. According to 
him, this is a very dangerous demagogy because it is so hard to rationalize national in-
terests. On the inside, it is practically impossible to identify them, and on the outside 
they are identified solely in the opposition to the interests of another nation. National-
ism has had particularly dire consequences in Europe, and this is embedded in the very 
idea of the European Union. The Union nowadays represents not only the basis of sta-
bility in Europe and the world, but a source of the new principles of international rela-
tions and the role of states. 
 There is a far-reaching debate going on, juxtaposing three kinds of states: pre-mod-
ern, modern and post-modern (Cooper, 2002). The first are more usually called the 
weak states, the second the national states, and the third the supra-national states. This is 
somewhat simplified, but no doubt it makes for a solid beginning for a more subtle and 
detailed analysis of the political and economic globalisation. It has been noticed from 
the start that the key problem is the relationship between the power and the law.27 It has 
also been correctly noted that this relationship is of utmost significance for the Euro-
pean Union as well. Francis Fukuyama says:  
“Europeans think that the bloody history of the first half of the 20th century is a direct 
consequence of its reliance on the unchecked national sovereignty. The house they have 
been building for themselves in the European Union since the 1850s is conceived in 
such a way that all those sovereignties be built into different levels of rules, norms and 
regulations in order to ensure they do not get out of control.” (Fukuyama, 2002).  
 
 Rationality and selfishness 
 Liberals and neoliberals have been criticized as ideologues of selfishness, inconsis-
tency, and utmost pragmatism which is frequently equated with individualism and ra-
tionalism.  
 First, the selfishness. Critics of individualism often assume that individuals are more 
selfish than communities, particularly states. This runs counter to the generally available 
facts. In democratic states, where individuals are sovereign, the transfers from the rich 
to the poor are more substantial than in non-democratic states, in which individuals are 
not sovereign. Moreover, where the states and not the individuals are sovereign (in in-
ternational relations), the transfers from the rich countries to the poor ones occur at a 
very limited scale and are frequently not motivated by altruism. 
 Generally speaking, the opinion of liberals about selfishness does not differ from 
everybody else’s opinion. They start from the fact that all the costs and the benefits are 
individual after all. People should be free to decide for themselves what they want to 
 
27 The topic of the now already influential article by Robert Kagan (2002). 
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achieve and at what price. Whether they are going to choose to be selfish or generous, is 
up to them. This is not even an argument against paternalism (opposed by most liberals 
anyway) if the decision to act out on somebody’s advice or demand is voluntary. 
 The fact that all the benefits and all the costs are eventually individual is sometimes 
overseen by those whose costs are borne by others. This analytical fact should be sepa-
rated from its institutionalization. The system of private ownership most probably ties 
individual costs and benefits, but it is not perfect. Also, theoretically one could imagine 
a system of taxation that would not break the rule that everybody has to pay their costs, 
but this is unfeasible in practice. Hence, certain re-distributions occur that violate indi-
vidual freedoms. This, however, has nothing to do with selfishness or altruism. It might 
be said, as Hayek claimed, that the democratic society may decide that a certain level of 
inequality is unacceptable. This does not have to be abominable for liberals.  
 Let me say a few words about the objection of rationalism. Sometimes liberalism is 
criticized for almost always assuming that people are rational. This is not a methodo-
logical view embraced by all liberals. Hayek, and those he branded as “true liberals”, 
were not rationalists in that sense. Popper, who might be to a point considered a liberal, 
was a rationalist in the sense that he thought that that was the assumption about human 
nature that by far is the least prescriptive of all alternative anthropologies that social sci-
ences may rely on. This is important because critics of rationalism often mention emo-
tions and adherence to traditions, something they consider an example of the non-ra-
tional if not irrational component of human nature, a sort of the naturalist or collectivist 
anthropology versus the rationalist one. 
 Nevertheless, this is most probably just a misunderstanding. The most frequent 
scientific version of such concepts is functionalism. However, it is founded on the idea 
of rationality; not the individual rationality but the natural or collective rationality. 
Hayek himself thought that individuals are not rational in the sense in which the theory 
requires them to be, but that markets are (Hayek, 1944). This might be open to debate 
when deciding on accepting methodological individualism, but this is in no way incom-
patible with rationalism.  
 There is nothing irrational in emotional responses. On the contrary, emotion-driven 
actions are most probably more rational (in the sense of instrumental rationality) than 
those considered calculated. I think that Hume was right. And although Max Weber 
distinguished between the traditional and the affective actions and the rational ones, he 
more than anybody showed that religious thinking, for example, just like all religious 
behaviour, is rational enough.  
 Another question is whether methodological individualism ought to be adopted. This 
question goes together with the one on the acceptability of the theoretical construct of 
the perfect market. Both these methodological views depend solely on their scientific 
success. If they can explain the facts relevant for social sciences, then these methodo-
logical postulates are acceptable. If they are not corroborated by facts, they lose all the 
meaning. This is not ideology but methodology. 
 And finally, liberalism is criticized as being pragmatic in the bad sense of the word 
i.e. that it is duplicitous and Machiavellian. Machiavelli’s influence on liberalism – as 
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well as on political thought in general – has been huge and manifold. He has left his 
mark on liberalism in two ways. Firstly, as Hume pointed out, Machiavelli thought that 
politics may be an object of scientific scrutiny. Secondly, as Isaiah Berlin pointed out, 
Machiavelli showed, often using drastic examples, that choices are inevitable and that 
there are no free-of-charge goals.  
 Machiavelli influenced non-liberal political doctrines and even politicians as a 
prophet or a guru. There are many politicians or would-be politicians who still do not let 
go of their copy of The Prince, from time to time reading some of his insights for advice 
or guidance. This is what is usually understood by Machiavellianism and what liberals 
have been persistently writing against. 
 
 Conclusion 
 Liberty and globalisation do not necessarily provide the best solutions without 
proper legal foundations, and it is difficult to legally lay them without a democratic pro-
cedure of decision-making. Since an international legal system and international democ-
racy will likely not happen in the near future, the choices facing the developed and un-
developed countries are not easy at all. Although liberalization is undoubtedly the only 
path to freedom, some of the neoliberal ideas have not proved appropriate and feasible. 
This is not the reason, however, to reject liberalism. On the contrary, this is the reason 
to continue efforts to bring down the walls dividing people and peoples. Although today 
pessimism is more justified than it was immediately after the collapse of the Berlin wall. 
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